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Abstract—A novel secure architecture for sensor networks that
make use of the LoRaWAN (Long-Range Wide Area Network)
protocol specification is proposed in this paper. The paper
analyses potential security threats and provides the protection
mechanisms and security recommendations to enable protected
data transmission and to prevent unauthorized access and data
loss in LoRaWAN sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
LoRaWAN is a well-known low power wide area network
technology that found a broad range of applications in IoT
[1]. Providing secure data transmission and preventing security
attacks in such applications is of critical importance. Security
aspects in LoRaWAN have been addressed in the past in
[2], which presents an analysis of the security of the Long
Range (LoRa) solution and its LoRaWAN protocol. This work
builds on the generic concepts of [2] and proposes a novel
secure LoRaWAN sensor architecture. The paper analyses the
potential security threats and implements different security
controls in order to protect data transmitted over the network
and to establish a strong line of defense in such networks.
II. SECURITY MECHANISMS IN LORAWAN
LoRaWAN is a protocol specification built on top of the
LoRa technology to enable low power, secure, bi-directional,
wide-area communication between remote sensors and gate-
ways connected to the network [1].
LoRaWAN provides encryption and signing of packets sent
over the network. For encryption, symmetric keys known by
the End-nodes, Network and Application Servers are used,
these being distributed in two different ways, depending on the
employed activation method, namely Over-The-Air Activation
(OTAA) and Activation By Personalization (ABP) [1].
Both activation methods provide a strong level of security
using symmetric encryption in message exchanges between
End-nodes and servers. The provided mechanisms eliminate
any possibility of an attacker to inject malicious End-nodes
or to take advantage of the network in the activation process
without knowing the End-node’s keys.
Despite of these built-in security mechanisms, a LoRaWAN
network should also be a secure network architecture, which
applies security controls and monitoring of the network to
provide confidentiality, data integrity and availability. In this
context, a novel secure LoRaWAN sensor network architecture
is proposed, as detailed next.
III. PROPOSED SECURE LORAWAN ARCHITECTURE
The proposed architecture, depicted in Fig. 1, implements
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) model using the open-
source solution provided by Cloudflare [3]. In this model, each
component holds a certificate signed by its own Certificate
Authority (CA) implemented at network level. All entities use
these certificates to communicate with relevant entities in the
network. This approach provides encryption, authentication
and integrity in message exchanges.
A. Network traffic control
For improved security, each entity implements Iptables rules
which allow only network traffic necessary for a functional
LoRaWAN application and for system maintenance, any other
unnecessary connections being denied.
B. Gateway-network communication
As shown in Fig. 1, the Gateway cannot be considered a
trustworthy network entity, as it lies outside of the controlled
network area. To provide secure data transmission and alleviate
potential exposure to security attacks originating from the
Gateway, the proposed LoRaWAN network implements a
Remote Access Virtual Private Network (VPN) server. In order
to access the internal network, each Gateway holds a certificate
generated by the VPN server, providing Gateway authenti-
cation and preventing any Gateway impersonation attempts.
Also, the VPN server maintains a white list of Gateway IPs,
avoiding in this manner the access of potentially malicious
Gateways or Gateway replication. The software utilized for
implementing the VPN server is OpenVPN [4].
Once connected to the internal network, the Gateways
should exchange data only with Brokers in a secure way,
over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) - see Fig. 1;
this provides security for User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
communications and prevents attacks such as eavesdropping,
tampering, or message forgery.
C. Broker level
The Broker’s role is to transport End-node messages re-
ceived from Gateways to upper network levels using MQTT
messaging protocol. To provide a secure connection between
the MQTT server, implemented at Broker level, and the
Network Server, the message exchanges should be made over
Transport Layer Security (TLS), a protocol that is capable of
securing the transport over TCP.
Fig. 1. Proposed LoRaWAN secure network architecture.
D. Network Server level
The Network Server interacts with multiple entities such
as the Broker, Application Server and the database (see
Fig. 1). The Network Server is responsible for network control
and MAC commands, main actions being to manage End-
node sessions, schedule acknowledgements, manage receiving
windows of End-nodes, eliminate duplicate packets and adapt
data rates. Moreover, the Network Server uses the network
keys (NwkSKey) to sign and verify messages sent between
End-nodes and the server in order to prevent data processing
of altered messages. Therefore, the key management mecha-
nism should be carefully implemented as the Network Server
represents a single point of failure in the LoRaWAN network.
E. Application Server level
The Application Server is also a sensitive component as it
generates and stores the keys used by the End-nodes in the
activation process and message encryption. The keys must be
stored in a secure way and accessible only by the Application
Server, the exception being the network keys (NwkSKey),
which have to be transmitted to the Network Server.
The Application Server employs also an Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API), which is used for application and
End-node management and to expose End-node data. This
interface is an important component as it provides access to
sensitive data outside of the controlled network area to applica-
tions making use of these data. Usually, the API exposes data
through a web server. Hence, the web server must implement
a secure connection by using Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
Secure (HTTPS), based on a TLS certificate signed by a global
Certificate Authority (e.g. Comodo or Let’s Encrypt).
The payloads received from End-nodes must be validated
and sanitized by the Application Server before performing
any other operations. The Application Server must implement
functions that check if the payload meets a set of criteria (e.g.
testing for length, format, range, and allowable characters),
accepting only expected payload formats. These techniques
are used to provide an in-depth defense at application level.
F. Access management
Access management is an important aspect in a secure in-
frastructure being responsible to granting access and privileges
to authorized users. Each entity, part of the proposed infras-
tructure, should allow a Secure Shell (SSH) connection, which
is necessary for system updating and maintenance processes.
The access should be made only from the internal network for
authorized persons based on user and IP whitelisting.
G. Availability
Availability aims at maintaining a correct functioning of the
system in order to keep data and resources available for au-
thorized use. To enable availability, the following mechanisms
were proposed and practically implemented.
Load Balancing, which is used to distribute the network
traffic to multiple services. Load balancers increase the ca-
pacity of a system to support concurrent connections and
keep data transmission continuity between components even
if one or more services are facing functional failures. In the
proposed secure architecture, load balancing can be used for
each entity, including the VPN, the Broker, the Network and
the Application Servers, and the API.
Database Clustering. Database clustering is a solution used
to increase database availability. In the proposed LoRaWAN
network architecture, two database clusters are present, serv-
ing the Network and Application Servers respectively. It is
mandatory to use database clustering and to develop fail-over
strategies for each database in the network in order to provide
continuity and availability of data transmission.
Data Backups. In the proposed architecture, data backups
are required for the databases used by the Network and
Application Servers. Data backups are also required for the
TABLE I
TESTING SCENARIOS, RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
Entity Scenario Result Recommendation
End-node Sniffing LoRa Traffic LoRaWAN messages are encrypted using AES128 offer-
ing a strong protection against intercepting data in transit.
Keys should be securely stored and access
should be allowed only to authorized entities.
End-node End-node impersonation LoRaWAN offers strong protection against impersonation
based on the sessions handled by the server. Imperson-
ation attempts generate error messages at Network Server.
Implement a monitoring mechanism that alerts
suspicious activities based on messages received
at Network Server level.
End-node Replay Messages Replay attacks are feasible in ABP, only OTAA config-
uration offers protection against such attacks.
Implement OTAA configuration for End-nodes.
Gateway Manipulate communica-
tion’s parameters
Manipulating the communication parameters may lead
to high power consumption on the End-nodes, battery
depletion, sensor breakdown and higher costs.




In this case, an attacker is able to alter the communication
between the Gateway and the internal network compo-
nents, to intercept all messages or even inject new ones.
Implement a VPN server which provides encryp-
tion and authentication for Gateways. Firewall
rules and IDS are necessary to enhance security.
IDS Rules violation Test the logging and alerting mechanisms by thoroughly
testing the implemented IDS rules
Employ security and event-management tools to





The Network Server creates new sessions and keeps the
old ones for each End-node. An attack generating a large
number of sessions may lead to database out-of-memory.
Remove any old End-node session when a new
session is generated. Also, each session should




loads using the End-nodes
No vulnerabilities found, but may differ from one imple-
mentation to another.
The Application Server should only accept ex-
pected payload formats from the End-nodes.
Unified logging system (see Fig. 1), which preserves the log’s
of each network entity. The data backups should be preserved
in a secure environment, outside of the internal network.
H. Monitoring and Intrusion detection system (IDS)
In a secure architecture model, the presence of an intru-
sion detection system is required to monitor network traffic
for malicious activity or policy violations. In the proposed
architecture, the IDS implementation is based on Snort [5],
which is an open source intrusion detection system for real-
time traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks.
In a LoRaWAN network, the most sensible points are
the entry points of the internal network; at these points,
one has to implement firewall rules to restrict connections
other than authorized connections required by the application’s
functionalities.
In a LoRaWAN network, the traffic to and from the Gate-
ways can be predicted by calculating the traffic generated by
the End-nodes. A good practice is to implement an anomaly-
based intrusion detection technique which monitors the traffic
and compares it against established baselines. As baselines
one identifies the usual bandwidth (with some margins), the
employed protocols, usually connected ports and devices;
such a system generates alerts when the detected traffic is
significantly different than the baseline.
Another sensitive points of the network are the API and the
access from corporate to the internal network. Network traffic
control is provided by the implemented Firewall rules. These
connection should be monitored by implementing a signature-
based intrusion detection technique which compares network
packets against a database of signatures or attributes from
known malicious threats. If malicious threats or unauthorized
access attempts to the internal network’s entities are detected,
the system generates alerts and notifies the network admin-
istrators. An anomaly-based detection technique can also be
used to complement the traffic monitoring process.
IV. SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
During security assessment of the proposed LoRaWAN net-
work architecture, multiple testing scenarios were performed.
Table I presents testing results and recommendations con-
cluded from each scenario. Details about the security aspects
of LoRa as well as more testing and implementation details
of this architecture are given in our recent work in [6].
V. CONCLUSIONS
The standard security features provided by LoRaWAN are
not sufficient for secure end-to-end sensor networks and
applications. This paper addresses the security concerns of
data protection and data privacy in applications based on
LoRaWAN. The paper proposes and implements a secure
LoRaWAN network architecture and presents a set of best
practices that have to be followed in order to build end-to-
end secure LoRaWAN sensor networks.
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